Cognitive control and flexibility in the context of stress and depressive symptoms: The cognitive control and flexibility questionnaire by Gabrys, R.L. (Robert L.) et al.
fpsyg-09-02219 November 15, 2018 Time: 15:43 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 19 November 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02219
Edited by:
Amitai Abramovitch,
Texas State University, United States
Reviewed by:
Hannah R. Snyder,
Brandeis University, United States
Jonathan Huppert,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel
*Correspondence:
Robert L. Gabrys
robert.gabrys@carleton.ca
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 20 March 2018
Accepted: 26 October 2018
Published: 19 November 2018
Citation:
Gabrys RL, Tabri N, Anisman H
and Matheson K (2018) Cognitive
Control and Flexibility in the Context
of Stress and Depressive Symptoms:
The Cognitive Control and Flexibility
Questionnaire.
Front. Psychol. 9:2219.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02219
Cognitive Control and Flexibility in
the Context of Stress and Depressive
Symptoms: The Cognitive Control
and Flexibility Questionnaire
Robert L. Gabrys1* , Nassim Tabri2, Hymie Anisman1,3 and Kimberly Matheson1,3
1 Department of Neuroscience, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada, 2 Department of Psychology, Carleton University,
Ottawa, ON, Canada, 3 The Royal’s Institute of Mental Health Research, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Cognitive control and (cognitive) flexibility play an important role in an individual’s ability
to adapt to continuously changing environments. In addition to facilitating goal-directed
behaviors, cognitive control and flexibility have been implicated in emotion regulation,
and disturbances of these abilities are present in mood and anxiety disorders. In the
context of stressful experiences, the reported studies examined processes related
to cognitive control and flexibility, emotional regulation and depressive symptoms. To
this end, a brief (18-item) self-report measure – the Cognitive Control and Flexibility
Questionnaire (CCFQ) – was developed. This questionnaire measures an individual’s
perceived ability to exert control over intrusive, unwanted (negative) thoughts and
emotions, and their ability to flexibly cope with a stressful situation. In Study 1, the
CCFQ was assessed among both university students (N = 300) and a community
sample (N = 302). Preliminary analyses suggested a stable and reliable two-factor
structure, that of cognitive control over emotion, and appraisal and coping flexibility.
Scores on the CCFQ were strongly associated with greater depressive symptoms,
even after controlling for other measures that had been taken to reflect cognitive
control and (in)flexibility (e.g., the Ruminative Response Scale; Perseverative Thinking
Questionnaire). In Study 2 (N = 368), lower scores on the CCFQ were related to
more negative stressor appraisals (i.e., greater perceived threat and uncontrollability)
of a personally meaningful stressful event. Perceptions of threat and uncontrollability,
in turn, partially accounted for the association between CCFQ subscale scores and
depressive symptoms. The relation between lower CCFQ scores and heightened
depressive symptoms was also partially accounted for by less frequent engagement in
problem-focused coping and more use of emotion-focused methods. In Study 3 (N = 47
females), lower scores on the cognitive control over emotion component of the CCFQ
predicted elevated negative affect and an exacerbated cortisol response following an
acute psychosocial stressor (Trier Social Stress Test). The present research points to
the CCFQ as a useful self-report tool to identify ways through which cognitive control
and flexibility might be manifested in stressful situations, and how reductions in flexibility
might be accompanied by elevated symptoms of depression.
Keywords: stress, cognitive flexibility, cognitive control, emotion regulation, coping, depression
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2219
fpsyg-09-02219 November 15, 2018 Time: 15:43 # 2
Gabrys et al. Stress, Cognitive Control and Flexibility
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control and (cognitive) flexibility play a fundamental
role in the ability to adapt to continuously changing
environments and have been associated with various goal-
oriented behaviors, including creativity, problem-solving,
multi-tasking, and decision-making (Rolls, 2000; Ionescu, 2012;
Dajani and Uddin, 2015). Cognitive control, and the processes
underlying this ability (executive functions) have also been
implicated in self- and emotional-regulation, as well as mental
health outcomes (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010; Hofmann et al.,
2012). Impaired cognitive control and flexibility have been
observed among depressed individuals and those at risk for the
disorder (Murphy et al., 2012; Snyder, 2013; Trivedi and Greer,
2014; Hou et al., 2016). Thus, greater attention has been devoted
to identifying factors that contribute to cognitive control and
flexibility (Logue and Gould, 2014; Shields et al., 2016), and
how disturbances of these abilities might be linked to depressive
illness (Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Koster et al., 2011).
Stressful events play an important role in the emergence
and maintenance of depressive disorders (Hammen, 2005). Since
cognitive dysfunction is often associated with depressive illness,
increased efforts have been made at understanding how various
types of stressors influence cognitive functioning (Lupien et al.,
2009), which may be relevant in identifying potential treatment
targets (Koster et al., 2017). Not surprisingly, most studies
that have assessed stressor effects on cognitive control and
flexibility have done so through neuropsychological or behavioral
measures (Liston et al., 2009; Compton et al., 2013; Shields
et al., 2016; Goldfarb et al., 2017). These studies have provided
insights into how stressors influence fundamental cognitive
processes (e.g., working memory, inhibition, set-shifting) and the
neurobiological systems mediating these effects (Alexander et al.,
2007; Liston et al., 2009; Plessow et al., 2012; Goldfarb et al., 2017).
However, such paradigms might provide a narrow perspective
of how cognitive control and flexibility might be displayed in
stressful experiences, and how reductions of these abilities are
manifested in behavioral disturbances. By example, the value of
a particular behavioral measure, such as the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Task (WCST), might provide an index of flexibility that
is limited to certain cognitive domains or situations.
The purpose of the present research was to explore ways
in which cognitive control and cognitive flexibility might be
expressed in stressful situations that are not readily captured
through behavioral tasks. It was also of interest to determine
how individual differences in these abilities can serve as
resilience or risk factors for depressive pathology. Accordingly,
a brief self-report measure – the Cognitive Control and
Flexibility Questionnaire (the CCFQ) – was constructed. The
CCFQ was modeled after conventional behavioral measures
of cognitive control and cognitive flexibility and assesses an
individual’s perceived ability to exhibit control over their
thoughts and behavior in a stressful situation. Study 1 described
the development and psychometric properties of the CCFQ,
including the factor structure of this questionnaire and its
relationship to other self-report measures which explicitly
or implicitly assess processes linked to cognitive control or
flexibility. Study 2 tested the hypothesis that greater cognitive
control/flexibility (as measured by the CCFQ) would be
associated with more favorable stressor appraisals and effective
coping, which in turn, would be predictive of lower levels
of depressive symptoms. Finally, Study 3 examined whether
differences in CCFQ scores moderated the effects of an acute
stressor on cognitive, affective, and neuroendocrine responses
following the challenge.
Defining and Measuring Cognitive
Control and Cognitive Flexibility
The concepts of cognitive control and of cognitive flexibility
have been difficult to define (Morton et al., 2011; Ionescu,
2012; Dajani and Uddin, 2015; Hutchison and Morton, 2016),
particularly as their definitions overlap and the same behavioral
tasks have been used to assess both abilities (Gläscher et al., 2012;
Díaz-Blancat et al., 2018). Generally, cognitive control refers to
the ability to focus on information that is currently relevant
to a particular goal, while inhibiting information that is not
relevant (Morton et al., 2011). Cognitive control is dependent
on multiple executive functions, including working memory,
inhibition, conflict monitoring, and set-shifting (Gläscher et al.,
2012; Mackie et al., 2013), and has often been discussed in
terms of facilitating flexible behavioral responses (Miller, 2000;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Mackie et al., 2013). Various behavioral
tasks have been used to measure specific components of cognitive
control, including the n-back task, the Stroop task, the Go/No-Go
task, and the WCST, among many others (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Harvey et al., 2005; Simmonds et al., 2008; Nyhus and Barceló,
2009).
Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to modify, or shift
between, “cognitive sets” or strategies in response to changes
in the environment (Deák, 2003; Stemme et al., 2007; Moore
and Malinowski, 2009). This ability has predominantly been
assessed by the WCST, the Intra-dimensional/Extra-dimensional
(ID/ED) shift task, and the Task Switching paradigm (Grant
and Berg, 1948; Downes et al., 1989; Monsell, 2003). Although
varying in task specificity, these behavioral paradigms assess the
efficiency (or inefficiency) in shifting attention between relevant
and irrelevant information. From a cognitive (neuro)science
perspective, cognitive flexibility has been viewed as an aspect
of cognitive control (i.e., set-shifting) or the manifestation of
multiple cognitive control processes which operate sequentially
or in parallel (Dajani and Uddin, 2015; Marko and Riecˇanský,
2018; Zaehringer et al., 2018).
In addition to their characterization as aspects of executive
functions, various behaviors are believed to represent cognitive
control and flexibility or, at least, be associated with these
constructs. For instance, (fluid) intelligence as well as creativity
and divergent thinking have been suggested to be expressions of
cognitive control and of cognitive flexibility (Colzato et al., 2006;
Chermahini and Hommel, 2010; Nijstad et al., 2010; Benedek
et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2017). Effective problem-solving
and decision-making were also proposed to highly depend on
cognitive flexibility (Cañas et al., 2003; Isen, 2008; Hare et al.,
2009). From a clinical perspective, cognitive flexibility has been
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described as the ability to change one’s maladaptive attitudes and
beliefs with more appropriate ones (Dennis and Vander Wal,
2010), and disturbances of cognitive control were proposed to
underpin the use of ineffective emotional regulation strategies,
including excessive rumination (Koster et al., 2011). Similarly, in
the context of emotional situations, the ability to flexibly attend to
and disengage from emotional aspects of a situation or a stimulus,
termed ‘affective flexibility,’ might also reflect cognitive control
and flexibility processes (Malooly et al., 2013). Although not
exhaustive, these examples demonstrate that the terms ‘cognitive
control’ and ‘cognitive flexibility’ have clearly been applied to
many different behaviors.
Different accounts of cognitive control and cognitive flexibility
have led to some confusion as to the defining features of these
abilities (Morton et al., 2011; Dajani and Uddin, 2015). Concern
has also been expressed that cognitive flexibility lacks a unified
definition, and that an unrestricted perspective can result in
very different constructs under the same name (Ionescu, 2012).
This can lead to theory and research being constructed around
mistaken assumptions about what is being measured. On the
other hand, a restricted definition of cognitive control or of
cognitive flexibility might also prove counterproductive as it can
limit the understanding of the role of these abilities in various
adaptive and maladaptive behaviors, including the relevance of
these constructs to psychopathology. Accordingly, we propose
that cognitive control and flexibility can, in fact, be expressed
multiple ways. The fundamental factor in the expression of
these abilities is highly dependent on context, including the
characteristics and demands of the situation. For example, it is
possible that an individual can be flexible in certain situations
(e.g., multitasking) but not in others (e.g., emotional regulation).
Cognitive Control and Flexibility in the
Context Stressful Situations
Cognitive control and flexibility have received a great deal
of attention across various contexts and situational (task)
demands. However, the ways through which these abilities might
be expressed in stressful situations is not fully understood.
We propose that cognitive control and flexibility can be
manifested through several core processes, which span attention,
appraisals/reappraisals, and the endorsement of certain coping
strategies.
Attention and Attentional Control
Cognitive control can be expressed through directing attention
toward information that is relevant to situation (or goal), while
inhibiting that which is not relevant. In a stressful situation,
this might entail focusing on threat-related information and that
which is conducive to eliminating a stressor, and away from non-
essential information. As the characteristics of a stressor evolve,
this might further comprise shifting attention to newly relevant
information, which might represent cognitive flexibility. Stressful
events are rarely static or isolated events, and individuals can
only attend to a limited amount of information at any given
time (Baddeley, 2003). Given the limited capacity of working
memory, the ability to focus on relevant information, ignore that
which is non-essential, and to flexibly shift attention between
multiple sources of information likely serves an adaptive function
in coping with continuously evolving stressor experiences.
Stressful events are inherently emotional experiences, and the
provocation of negative affective states can influence cognition by
biasing information processing toward mood-congruent material
(Okon-Singer et al., 2015). Initially, negative emotional responses
(e.g., anxiety) might serve an adaptive purpose by directing
necessary resources toward distressing stimuli or those requiring
coping efforts. However, a preoccupation with negative thoughts
and emotions, especially when they are counterproductive in
resolving a stressful situation, might limit an individual’s coping
effectiveness, and exacerbate the adverse effects of stressors.
Extended processing of negative emotional information can
result in prolonged and exacerbated negative mood that, over
time, might contribute to depressive states (Joormann et al.,
2007), and it appears that the inability to disengage from
negative emotional information (i.e., cognitive inhibition) might
be a defining characteristic of depressive pathology (Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010). Likewise, it appears that fundamental cognitive
control processes, such as inhibition, play an important role in
emotional regulation, where disturbances of cognitive control
favor repetitive negative thinking and rumination (Joormann
et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2011). Thus, in the context of a stressful
situations, cognitive control and flexibility might be expressed
through the ability to effectively regulate, or disengage from,
negative thoughts and emotions when they no longer serve an
adaptive purpose. Diminished cognitive control (and cognitive
flexibility), by contrast, might be associated with increased
repetitive (or perseverative) negative thinking, rigid information
processing (e.g., negative biases in attention and memory),
and the maintenance of negative emotional states (Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010).
Appraisals and Reappraisals
When a potentially stressful situation is first encountered,
appraisals are made concerning the extent to which the
potential stressor poses a threat and whether the individual
has the necessary resources to cope with the experience
(Lazarus, 1999; Folkman, 2013). An individual might arrive
at an appraisal relatively rapidly, or with little consideration
for the context of the situation. Conversely, the appraisal
process might occur more slowly and deliberately, whereby the
individual approaches the situation from multiple perspectives
or contemplates several possible explanations before responding
(Lazarus, 1999). Following from this perspective, forming
negative appraisals (e.g., interpreting a situation as threatening
or uncontrollable) might not necessarily be counterproductive.
However, when negative appraisals are applied across situations
without considering different characteristics of the various
contexts, sustained negative mood is apt to occur (Lackner et al.,
2015). Cognitive flexibility might, therefore, involve deliberate
appraisal processing, in which multiple alternative appraisals or
explanations are determined across stressful situations (Dennis
and Vander Wal, 2010).
The appraisal process is dynamic, such that the initial
interpretation of a stressful situation, and the perceived ability
to cope with it, can be modified, or reappraised, over time
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(Lazarus, 1999; Folkman, 2013; Cheng et al., 2014). Infrequent
engagement in reappraisal processes, or difficulty in doing so,
can result in the maintenance of negative affect and has been
related to elevated symptoms of depression (Gross and John,
2003; Joormann and Gotlib, 2010). Cognitive control has been
suggested to play an important role in the reappraisal process
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2012), and thus this
might be a way through which this ability is expressed in stressful
situations. Moreover, the reappraisal process involves shifting
“cognitive sets” that are elicited by a stressor, and thus this might
be another way through which cognitive flexibility becomes
apparent in stressful situations. Consistent with this view, it
was suggested that cognitive flexibility allows for shifts between
implementation and maintenance of new reappraisals, while
working memory is related to the maintenance and monitoring
stages of new reappraisals (Zaehringer et al., 2018).
Coping Selection and Flexibility
Stressor appraisals are followed by the selection of coping
methods to contend with the stressor directly and/or regulate
emotional responses (Folkman, 2013). Importantly, although
certain coping methods (e.g., problem-solving) seem to be more
adaptive than others (e.g., rumination), the effectiveness of any
specific strategy or combination of strategies is highly situation-
dependent (Matheson and Anisman, 2003). Given this view,
optimal coping was proposed to involve flexibility, which can
take the form of having a broad and well-balanced coping
profile, alternating coping strategies across situations (Cheng
et al., 2014). The defining features of coping flexibility closely
resemble the hallmark characteristic of cognitive flexibility, which
is modifying cognitive or behavioral strategies in response to
changing environmental demands. Thus, in the context of a
stressful situation, cognitive flexibility might be observed through
the ability to generate multiple coping strategies, and to flexibly
adjust them according to changing stressor demands. In addition,
as mentioned earlier, excessive use of rumination, a coping or
emotion regulation strategy characterized by repeated negative
thinking concerning one’s dysphoric state (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008), has been hypothesized to be rooted in disturbances
of cognitive control (Joormann et al., 2007; Koster et al.,
2011). In stressor contexts, cognitive control might, therefore, be
accompanied by the increased ability to disengage from repetitive
negative thinking (i.e., rumination) which can not only serve to
attenuate negative emotional states, but also facilitate proactive
coping efforts (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
Given that stressful situations are often accompanied by
negative emotional responses, cognitive control and flexibility
in this context might inherently be tied to the regulation of
emotions (e.g., reducing negative emotions or increasing positive
emotions through cognitive control). Further, consistent with
the conventional view of these constructs (abilities), we consider
cognitive control and flexibility to be an individual characteristic
that is relatively stable overtime. However, encountering chronic
stressors can progressively diminish these abilities (Liston et al.,
2009), which could comprise effective emotional regulation.
Specifically, chronic stressor exposure can result in continuously
engaging limited cognitive resources (e.g., executive functions)
required to cope effectively with situational demands. Over time,
these cognitive resources may become exhausted, which could
be considered a cognitive form of allostatic overload (McEwen,
2003). This, in turn, might lead to greater difficulty engaging
in flexible behaviors, resulting in more automatic or reflexive
responses and difficulties in regulating emotions.
Development of the Cognitive Control
and Flexibility Questionnaire (CCFQ)
To our knowledge, there are current no self-report measures
which directly assess cognitive control in stressful situations.
Although it can be argued that the Perseverative Thinking
Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011) and the Ruminative
Response Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003) measure products
of reduced cognitive control, these questionnaires were not
designed to be specific to stressor contexts. The Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory (Dennis and Vander Wal, 2010) appears
to be the only questionnaire to measure aspects of cognitive
flexibility relevant to stressful, or difficult, situations. The
developers of this inventory conceptualized cognitive flexibility
as being able to challenge and replace maladaptive thoughts with
more balanced and adaptive thinking. From this perspective,
the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory was designed to measure the
tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable (control
subscale), the ability to perceive multiple alternative explanations
for life occurrences and human behavior, and the ability to
generate multiple alternative solutions to difficult situations
(alternatives subscale).
This inventory measures several important features of
cognitive flexibility that might be relevant to depressive disorders.
However, it was suggested that the control subscale might
measure self-efficacy rather than cognitive flexibility (Johnco
et al., 2014). Moreover, although the alternatives subscale more
closely resembles the construct of cognitive flexibility, it was not
predictive of cognitive restructuring outcome measures (Johnco
et al., 2014). Being a relatively brief (20-item) questionnaire,
it understandably does not capture all instances of cognitive
flexibility (or of cognitive control) that may be important to
stressful situations. Thus, further exploration into how cognitive
control and flexibility might be apparent in these contexts might
be important, especially in understanding how reductions in
these abilities might favor mental health disturbances.
The main purpose of the present research was to develop and
evaluate the utility of a novel self-report measure of cognitive
control and flexibility that would be specific to stressful situations
(the CCFQ). The CCFQ was conceptualized and modeled after
the type of cognitive control and cognitive flexibility measured
through ‘cold’ executive function tasks (e.g., the Go/No-Go
task, the WCST), where the defining features of these measures
(inhibiting a prepotent response, shifting cognitive sets or
behavioral strategies) served as a foundation for the development
of this measure. In order to make these concepts relevant to
a stressful situation, cognitive content (i.e., the information
that is being manipulated) was operationalized as thoughts,
emotions, stressor appraisals, or coping strategies. Control and
flexibility were operationalized through statements reflecting
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shifting, inhibition, updating, including “shifting my attention,”
“ignoring,” “setting aside,” “generating multiple . . .”, “thinking of
several ways . . .”, “reframing,” and “re-evaluating.”
Since stressful experiences often elicit negative emotions,
emphasis was placed on how cognitive control and flexibility
might be manifested in emotional regulation. From this
perspective, the current conceptualization of cognitive control
and flexibility can be said to tap into ‘hot’ executive functions.
However, being a self-report measure, the CCFQ was not
designed to assess ‘hot’ executive functions per se, but
instead focused on an individual’s perceived levels of cognitive
functioning and the implications for emotional regulation
and coping effectiveness. Thus, the type of cognitive control
and flexibility measured by the CCFQ was intended to
converge on the evidence implicating the involvement of
basic cognitive control processes in emotion regulation (Koster
et al., 2011). Accordingly, the CCFQ was specifically designed
to assess an individual’s perceived ability to exert control
over intrusive, unwanted (negative) thoughts and emotions,
and their ability to flexibly adapt to stressful situations. As
previously described, these features of cognitive control and
flexibility were proposed to be expressed through three core
processes: attention and attentional control, appraisals and
reappraisals, and coping selection and flexibility. Finally, the
CCFQ was intended to measure trait-like abilities which can,
however, be diminished following chronic or prolonged stressor
exposure.
STUDY 1. DEVELOPMENT AND
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND FLEXIBILITY
QUESTIONNAIRE (CCFQ)
The present study describes the development of the CCFQ as well
as the factor structure and reliability of this measure in both a
student and a community sample. To evaluate construct validity,
a comparison was made between the final (18-item) version
of the CCFQ and the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (Dennis
and Vander Wal, 2010). In addition to the Cognitive Flexibility
Inventory, we examined the relation between the CCFQ and
several previously developed questionnaires that we believed
captured features of cognitive control and flexibility (e.g., the
Coping Flexibility Questionnaire; Vriezekolk et al., 2012) or
reductions of these abilities (e.g., the Perseverative Thinking
Questionnaire; Ehring et al., 2011). These additional validation
measures were also used to investigate distinct and overlapping
features of the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory and the CCFQ.
It was hypothesized that the CCFQ would more directly tap
into cognitive control and emotional regulation, whereas the
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory would be more aligned with
flexibility in coping. As a final objective, the present study
determined whether the CCFQ was able to capture aspects of
cognitive control/flexibility that might be relevant to depressive
disorders that are not measured by other questionnaires related
to this construct.
Materials and Methods
Item Generation for the CCFQ
A comprehensive review was initially conducted to explore
the ways in which cognitive control and flexibility have
previously been conceptualized (e.g., executive functions) and
assessed (e.g., WCST). A parallel review was undertaken
to investigate how control/flexibility might be manifested
in stressful situations, which included literature pertaining
to attention (set-shifting) and cognitive control as well as
stressor appraisals and coping processes. Based on these
reviews, 116 items were generated that were believed to reflect
cognitive control/flexibility (or reductions of these abilities) in
response to stressful experiences, ranging from basic attentional
processes to emotional regulation. This initial pool of items
was presented to 25 graduate students in psychology and
neuroscience who responded to each item and provided feedback
as to which of the items were redundant or worded in a
confusing or ambiguous manner. Items were further eliminated
based on low inter-item correlations (r < 0.20), redundancy
(r > 0.80), confusing or ambiguous wording, or respondents’
interpretations of the item did not fully represent the current
conceptualization of cognitive control or of cognitive flexibility.
Based on these procedures, 44 preliminary items were retained
and used for further evaluation in the student sample in
Study 1.
Student Sample
Participants
Participants comprised 300 undergraduates (n = 216 females, 84
males), with a mean age of 19.23 (SD = 1.71 years). Self-reported
ethnic background included Caucasian (72.6%, n = 218), Black
(6.0%, n = 18), Asian (4.7%, n = 14), Arab (4.0%, n = 12), South
Asian (4.0%, n = 12), Hispanic (2.3%, n = 7), Aboriginal (1.7%,
n = 5), South East Asian, 1.0% (n = 3), and other (e.g., mixed
ethnicity, 3.7%, n = 11).
Procedure
Participants were recruited through the university’s computerized
recruitment system and completed an online survey in which
they responded to the 44-item version CCFQ. The CCFQ was
introduced as follows:
“The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine what you
generally think/feel/do when stressful situations provoke negative
thoughts and emotions. Of course, you may act differently
depending on the situation, but try to think of what you usually
think/feel/do when you are stressed or upset. Using the scale
below, indicate the extent to which agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Generally, in stressful situations . . . (specific question follows
here)”
Participants responded to each statement on a scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In
addition to the preliminary version of the CCFQ, participants
completed several validation measures, comprising the Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory, Coping Flexibility Questionnaire, Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire, Ruminative Response Scale, and
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire and their relations to
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current depressive symptoms. Upon completion of the study,
participants received written debriefing and were compensated
with course credit.
Measures
The Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI; Dennis and
Vander Wal, 2010) is a 20-item measure that assesses two
aspects of cognitive flexibility: (1) the ability to perceive
multiple alternative explanations for life occurrences and to
generate multiple alternative solutions to difficult situations
(alternatives), (2) and the tendency to perceive difficult
situations as controllable (control). Each statement was rated
on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Scores for each subscale were computed by first
reversing item scores where relevant, and then summing the
appropriate items for each subscale. The internal reliabilities
for the alternatives and control subscales were 0.91 and 0.83,
respectively.
The Coping Flexibility Questionnaire (COFLEX; Vriezekolk
et al., 2012) is a 13-item questionnaire that assesses the capability
of switching between assimilative and accommodative coping
strategies (versatility) and the capability of generating and
considering coping options, and appraising the suitability
of a coping strategy in a given situation (reflective coping).
Each statement was rated from 1 (seldom or never) to 4
(almost always), and higher scores indicated greater coping
flexibility. Scores for each subscale were computed by
summing all relevant items. The internal reliabilities for the
versatility and reflective coping subscales were 0.80 and 0.56,
respectively.
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and
John, 2003) is a 10-item questionnaire assessing individual
differences in the habitual use of two emotion regulation
strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. All
items are rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly Agree). Scores were computed by summing ratings
for all respective items for the cognitive reappraisal (α = 0.88)
and expressive suppression (α = 0.75) subscales, with higher
scores indicating greater use of that particular emotion regulation
strategy.
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003) is a
widely used 22-item questionnaire assessing ruminative response
styles to sad or depressed mood. For each statement, participants
respond on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) and
scores are computed by summing all relevant items. The present
study focused on the brooding (α = 0.81) and reflective pondering
(α = 0.82) subscales.
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring
et al., 2011) is a 15-item questionnaire assessing content-
independent repetitive negative thinking. Participants responded
to each item on a scale 0 (never) to 4 (almost always),
and a total score was computed by summing all 15 items
(α = 0.95).
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) is
a widely used 21-item measure that assesses the intensity of
depressive symptoms. For each item, participants respond to
one of four options which range from low to high depression
symptomatology. Total scores were calculated by summing across
all 21 items (α = 0.92).
Community Sample
Participants
Participants in the community sample comprised 302 (n = 253
females, 49 males) individuals living in Canada with a mean
age of 32.83 (SD = 10.36 years). Self-reported ethnic identities
included Caucasian (72.8%, n = 220), Asian (11.9%, n = 36),
South Asian (5.0%, n = 15), Black (2.0%, n = 6), Arab (2.0%,
n = 6), Aboriginal (1.3%, n = 4), Hispanic (1.0%, n = 3), South
East Asian, (1.0%, n = 3), and other (e.g., mixed ethnicity,
2.6%, n = 8). Self-reported levels of education included 8 years
or less of elementary school (0.3%, n = 1), some high school
but no diploma (4.3%, n = 13), a high school diploma or
equivalent (18.9%, n = 57), 1 to 3 years of college/university
(39.7%, n = 120), an undergraduate degree (25.5%, n = 77),
a master’s degree (7.9%, n = 24), a doctoral degree (0.3%,
n = 1), and a professional degree (e.g., medicine, dentistry) (2.6%,
n = 8).
Procedure
Participants were recruited to participate in a survey called
“Coping with Stress” using websites, such as Facebook, Kijiji
and Craig’s List, and through word of mouth. In the online
consent form, participants were informed that validity checks
would be performed on all data to ensure the integrity of
responses, and that only those who responded faithfully
would receive compensation ($5 gift card to Starbucks
or Tim Hortons). Validity checks included (i) the length
of time required to complete the survey, (ii) answering
8 out of 12 preselected questions in a non-random way,
and completing over half the survey (approximately 70%).
Additionally, IP addresses were checked to ensure that the
same participant did not complete the survey multiple times.
Once consent had been granted, participants completed the
shortened (18-item) CCFQ in addition to several related
questionnaires. Following the completion of the survey,
participants received written debriefing and were mailed their
gift card.
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS version 20
for Windows (SPSS Science, Chicago, IL, United States).
Principal components analyses (PCA) with Promax rotation
were used to explore the factor structure of the CCFQ in
a student and community sample. Pearson’s correlation
coefficients were used to examine the relation between
components of the CCFQ, validation measures, and depressive
symptoms. Partial correlations determined the strength
of relationship between components of the CCFQ and
validation measures, after controlling the Cognitive Flexibility
Inventory. Partial correlations were also used to assess the
strength of relation between components of the CCFQ
and depressive symptoms, after controlling each validation
measure. As many correlations were generated in the present
study, to account for the probability of a Type 1 error, the
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threshold for statistical significance was adjusted to p = 0.0009
(p = 0.05/58)
Results and Discussion
Exploratory Factor Analysis: Student Sample
A PCA with Promax rotation (since the factors were expected
to be correlated) was conducted to explore the factor structure
of the preliminary 44-item CCFQ and to select the final items
for this measure. The Kaiser measure of sampling adequacy was
0.95 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was χ2(946) = 7724.90,
p < 0.001. Although inspection of eigenvalues and scree plot
for the 44 items suggested a 7-factor solution, only the first 2
factors explained greater than 10% of the total variance across
items (Factor 1 = 38.11% and Factor 2 = 11.23%). Furthermore,
examination of the unrotated loadings suggested that factors 3 to
7 were not major components as they had fewer than 3 items with
substantial (>0.40) factor loadings (see Supplementary Table 1).
A parallel analysis (Zwick and Velicer, 1986), in which the actual
eigenvalues were compared to average eigenvalues derived from a
series of randomly generated data sets (in this case 5000 samples),
further supported the presence of two factors.
Based on these analyses, 26 items were eliminated from the
initial 44-item pool due to low factor loadings (<0.40) on the two
primary factors, were redundant, or were not consistent with the
constructs represented by the two primary factors. A second PCA
was conducted on the remaining 18 items, in which the number
of factors extracted was restricted to two. The Kaiser measure
of sampling adequacy was 0.92 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
was χ2(153) = 2704.62, p < 0.001. Table 1 (Student sample)
presents the factor structure of the 18-item CCFQ as well as the
eigenvalues and percentage of variance accounted for by each of
the two factors. Scores for each factor/component were computed
by, first, reverse scoring the appropriate items (indicated by the
asterisk in Table 1), and then taking the mean of all relevant items
(indicated in bold in Table 1).
After examining the items within each factor, Factor 1
was labeled cognitive control over emotion and Factor 2
appraisal and coping flexibility, The cognitive control over
emotion dimension comprised items assessing fundamental
cognitive control processes (e.g., attention, inhibition, and set-
shifting) which might be essential in regulating negative, and
potentially irrelevant, thoughts and emotions elicited by a
stressful situation. In contrast, the appraisal and coping flexibility
component measured more complex processes related to changes
of appraisals (e.g., approaching a situation from multiple
perspectives, and regulating emotions through reappraisal
processes) and the generation of a broad range of coping
strategies. As indicated by Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in
Table 1, the cognitive control over emotion and appraisal and
coping flexibility dimensions of the CCFQ exhibited excellent
internal reliability, and the correlation between the two factors
was r = 0.49, suggesting a moderate degree of overlap.
Exploratory Factor Analysis: Community Sample
A PCA with Promax rotation was conducted to determine
whether the factor structure of the final (18-item) CCFQ
observed in the student sample matched that of a community
sample. The Kaiser measure of sampling adequacy was.94 and
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was χ2(153) = 3322.95, p < 0.001.
For this PCA, we did not place a restriction on the number
of factors produced. The factor structure of the CCFQ in the
community sample was nearly identical to that observed in
the student sample, with the exception of one item. In the
community sample, the item ‘I can remain in control of my
thoughts and emotions’ loaded more strongly on the appraisal
and coping flexibility component of the CCFQ. However, as
this item more substantively represents cognitive control over
emotion and loaded more strongly on this factor in the student
sample, we retained this item on the cognitive control over
emotion factor. The two subscales exhibited excellent inter-item
reliability, and were moderately correlated (r = 0.61). Together,
these preliminary factor analyses and reliability assessments
suggest that the CCFQ exhibits a stable two-factor structure in
a student and community sample.
Construct, Convergent, and Incremental Validity
As shown in Table 2, both subscales of the CCFQ were
significantly correlated with nearly all validation measures
of cognitive control and (in)flexibility. The strength of the
correlations, however, differed for each component of the CCFQ.
The cognitive control over emotion component was more closely
related to the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire and the
Ruminative Response Scale, whereas as the appraisal and coping
flexibility dimension exhibited a stronger association with the
Coping Flexibility Questionnaire. Both components of the CCFQ
were similarly associated with the cognitive reappraisal, but not
the expressive suppression subscales of the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire. These findings suggest that the CCFQ captures
aspects of cognitive control and of cognitive flexibility that might
be relevant to stressful situations.
As expected, the CCFQ was correlated with the Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory, suggesting some degree of content overlap
between the two questionnaires. As shown in Table 2, the
appraisal and coping flexibility component of the CCFQ was most
strongly associated with the alternatives facet of the Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory. Indeed, it is in the measurement of coping
processes that the two measures overlap the most with respect
to content, which is most noticeable by their relationship to
the versatility in coping subscale of the Coping Flexibility
Questionnaire. There is, however, one important difference
between these two subscales. Whereas the alternatives facet
of the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory more directly measures
the tendency to generate multiple explanations for difficult
situations, the appraisal and coping flexibility dimension of
the CCFQ assesses the use of reappraisals aimed at regulating
negative thoughts and emotions, and difficulties in doing so. In
fact, this likely explains why the appraisal and coping flexibility
dimension of the CCFQ was more strongly correlated with the
reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
It is important to point out that the way in which ‘reappraisals’
(or the process of reappraising) are assessed by the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire and the CCFQ differs in a subtle,
but notable, way. In the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire,
reappraisal largely refers to “changing what I’m thinking about”
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TABLE 1 | Promax-rotated, Principal Components Analysis of the CCFQ in a student and community sample.
Student sample Community sample
Item Cognitive control over
emotion
Appraisal and coping
flexibility
Cognitive control over
emotion
Appraisal and coping
flexibility
(1) I get easily distracted by upsetting thoughts or
feelings.∗ (11)
0.89 −0.14 0.82 0.07
(2) My thoughts and emotions interfere with my ability
to concentrate.∗ (16)
0.85 −0.16 0.92 −0.13
(3) I have a hard time managing my emotions.∗ (15) 0.81 0.01 0.82 0.03
(4) It’s hard for me to shift my attention away from
negative thoughts or feelings.∗ (18)
0.81 −0.02 0.83 0.02
(5) I feel like I lose control over my thoughts and
emotions.∗ (2)
0.74 0.11 0.82 0.02
(6) It is easy for me to ignore distracting thoughts. (8) 0.72 −0.05 0.45 0.23
(7) It’s difficult to let go of intrusive thoughts or
emotions.∗ (4)
0.70 −0.09 0.80 −0.17
(8) I find it easy to set-aside unpleasant thoughts or
emotions. (7)
0.66 0.11 0.33 0.30
(9) I can remain in control of my thoughts and
emotions. (14)
0.59 0.19 0.36 0.48
(10) I take the time to think of more than one way to
resolve the problem. (12)
−0.13 0.89 0.02 0.87
(11) I approach the situation from multiple angles. (3) −0.13 0.88 −0.05 0.92
(12) I consider the situation for multiple viewpoints
before responding. (5)
−0.13 0.86 −0.23 0.91
(13) I take the time to see things from different
perspectives before reacting. (10)
−0.10 0.76 0.82 0.82
(14) I take the time to think of several ways to best
cope with the situation before acting. (6)
0.14 0.68 0.02 0.86
(15) I weigh out my options before choosing how to
take action. (1)
−0.02 0.68 −0.00 0.66
(16) I manage my thoughts or feelings by reframing
the situation. (17)
0.26 0.61 0.16 0.74
(17) I control my thoughts and feelings by putting the
situation into context. (13)
0.29 0.48 0.13 0.59
(18) I can easily think of multiple coping options
before deciding how to respond. (9)
0.37 0.46 0.10 0.77
Eigen value 7.48 2.73 2.37 8.75
Variance Explained (%) 41.57 15.19 13.16 48.62
Mean (SD) 3.71(1.16) 4.62(0.94) 3.89(1.28) 4.50(1.18)
Cronbach’s α 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.93
∗ Indicates reversed items. Bold indicates the factor in which the items were retained. Numbers in parentheses indicate the order in which the items should be administered.
TABLE 2 | Zero-order correlations between the CCFQ and validation measures of cognitive control and cognitive (in)flexibility.
Control
(CFI)
Alternatives
(CFI)
Versatility
(COFLEX)
Reflective
coping
(COFLEX)
Cognitive
reappraisal
(ERQ)
Expressive
suppression
(ERQ)
Brooding
(RRS)
Reflective
pondering
(RRS)
Perseverative
thinking
(PTQ)
Cognitive control
over emotion
0.56∗ 0.29∗ 0.41∗ −0.01 0.45∗ −0.02 −0.57∗ −0.35∗ −0.73∗
Appraisal and
coping flexibility
0.36∗ 0.66∗ 0.50∗ 0.23∗ 0.46∗ −0.06 −0.29∗ −0.02 −0.35∗
CFI Control – – 0.47∗ 0.06 0.29∗ −0.19∗ −0.45∗ −0.22∗ −0.55∗
CFI Alternatives – – 00.41∗ 0.35∗ 0.33∗ −0.16 0.26∗ 0.04 −0.19
CFI, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory; COFLEX, Coping Flexibility Questionnaire; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; PTQ,
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire; ∗p < 0.0009.
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TABLE 3 | Partial correlations between the CCFQ and validation measures of cognitive control and cognitive (in)flexibility after controlling for the Alternatives and Control
subscales of the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory.
Versatility
(COFLEX)
Reflective
coping
(COFLEX)
Cognitive
reappraisal
(ERQ)
Expressive
suppression
(ERQ)
Brooding
(RRS)
Reflective
pondering
(RRS)
Perseverative
thinking (PTQ)
Cognitive control over emotion 0.18 −0.10 0.35∗ 0.11 −0.42∗ −0.28∗ −0.62∗
Appraisal & coping flexibility 0.30∗ 0.00 0.32∗ 0.08 −0.15∗ 0.07 −0.25∗
COFLEX, Coping Flexibility Questionnaire; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; PTQ, Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire;
∗p < 0.0009.
TABLE 4 | Partial correlations between the CCFQ and depressive symptoms after controlling for validation measures of cognitive control and cognitive (in)flexibility.
Depressive symptoms controlling for
Zero-order
correlation
Control
(CFI)
Alternatives
(CFI)
Versatility
(COFLEX)
Reflective
coping
(COFLEX)
Cognitive
reappraisal
(ERQ)
Expressive
suppression
(ERQ)
Brooding
(RRS)
Reflective
pondering
(RRS)
Perseverative
thinking
(PTQ)
Cognitive control
over emotion
−0.55∗ −0.41∗ −0.52∗ −0.49∗ −0.55∗ −0.47∗ −0.56∗ −0.35∗ −0.47∗ −0.24∗
Appraisal and
coping flexibility
−0.34∗ −0.21∗ −0.25∗ −0.22∗ −0.34∗ −0.21∗ −0.33∗ −0.22∗ −0.37∗ −0.18
CFI, Cognitive Flexibility Inventory; COFLEX, Coping Flexibility Questionnaire; ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; PTQ,
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire. ∗p < 0.0009.
to either reduce negative emotions or enhance positive emotions
(Gross and John, 2003). In addition to assessing the use of
this form of reappraisal (“I manage my thoughts or feelings by
reframing the situation.”), the appraisal and coping flexibility
subscale CCFQ, measures perspective-taking (e.g., considering
a situation from multiple viewpoints) as a form of modifying
appraisals associated with a stressful situation.
As displayed in Table 2, the cognitive control over emotion
component of the CCFQ was more strongly linked to the control
subscale of the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory. However, the
conceptualization and assessment of control differs substantially
between the two measures. Specifically, whereas the control
subscale of the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory assesses perceived
controllability over difficult situations, the cognitive control over
emotions component of the CCFQ measures the extent to
which an individual can exert control of negative thoughts and
emotions. To be sure, the CCFQ displayed a stronger relationship
with cognitive reappraisal, brooding, and perseverative thinking,
whereas the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory was more closely tied
to reflective coping and expressive suppression. In essence, unlike
the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory, the CCFQ more directly
taps into processes related to cognitive control and emotional
regulation, most notably, the ability (or inability) to disengage
from negative cognitive and emotional states.
To further identify common and distinct feathers between
the two scales, partial correlations between the CCFQ and
validation measures, controlling for both subscales of the
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory, were examined. As shown in
Table 3, the cognitive control over emotion component of the
CCFQ remained strongly associated with cognitive reappraisal,
perseverative thinking, and rumination, and the appraisal and
coping flexibility component was still highly related to coping
versatility. In line with the data presented in Table 2, the
CCFQ was no longer linked to reflective coping and expressive
suppression (Table 3). Thus, on the whole, the CCFQ appears
to capture several key elements of cognitive control, coping,
and emotion regulation beyond those assessed by the Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory.
An important objective of the present study was to determine
whether the CCFQ predicted depressive symptoms beyond
that of previously developed self-report measures which, either
explicitly or implicitly, assessed processes related to cognitive
control and cognitive flexibility. As shown in Table 4, after
controlling for each validation measure, both subscales of the
CCFQ still predicted depressive symptoms. The only notable
decrease in the correlation between the CCFQ and depressive
symptoms appeared to occur when controlling for perseverative
thinking and rumination. This suggests that the CCFQ taps into
repetitive (negative) thinking that often accompanies symptoms
of depression. Indeed, this was expected given that diminished
cognitive control (and cognitive flexibility) is characterized
by perseverative responding. The CCFQ, however, addresses
other aspects of cognitive control that are related to depressive
pathology. For instance, beyond repetitive negative thinking,
disturbances of cognitive control can also be expressed by
difficulties preventing negative emotional information from
entering working memory and an inability to disengage such
emotional material once it has been attended to (Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010). In this regard, whereas the Perseverative
Thinking Questionnaire focuses specifically on repetitive thought
independent of content, the cognitive control over emotions
component of the CCFQ assesses, more broadly, the ability to
exhibit control over (primarily negative) thoughts and emotions.
This said, it is important to acknowledge the high correlation
between the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire and the
cognitive control over emotions component of the CCFQ, which
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suggests a high degree of overlap between the two measures
and potential redundancy. Indeed, this raises the possibility that
both measures can be used to assess the same processes and
administered in the same or similar contexts.
Unlike other questionnaires, the CCFQ measures not only
whether an individual engages in behaviors reflecting cognitive
control and flexibility, but also perceived difficulties in doing
so. In fact, it might be these specific perceptions (i.e., level
of difficulty in cognitive control) that might predict depressive
symptoms beyond the other measures used in Study 1.
It is important to mention that although the CCFQ was
designed to assess relatively stable individual characteristics, we
have yet to test the stability of this measure over time. Thus,
the lack of test-retest reliability of the CCFQ is an important
limitation of the present study. This notwithstanding, the present
findings support the notion that the CCFQ might be a useful
self-report measure of processes related to cognitive control and
flexibility in the context of stressful situations. As indicated by
its relationship to the validation measures, the CCFQ appears
to tap into multiple ways through which cognitive control and
flexibility might be expressed in stressful situations in a single,
brief questionnaire. At the same time, this questionnaire provides
unique predictive utility for understanding depressive symptoms,
beyond that of other measures.
STUDY 2. THE CCFQ IN RELATION TO
STRESSOR APPRAISALS AND COPING
STYLE
Study 2 examined whether scores on the CCFQ were predictive of
stressor appraisals and coping style, and whether these processes
mediated the relation between cognitive control/flexibility
(assessed through the CCFQ) and depressive symptoms. Since the
data in the present study were cross-sectional, mediation analyses
were not intended to address causality. Instead, these analyses
were used to determine whether stressor appraisals, coping
strategies, or both accounted for a significant proportion of the
variance in the relation CCFQ subscale scores and depressive
symptoms. Prior to these analyses, an Exploratory Structural
Equation Model (ESEM) was used to confirm the two-factor
structure of the CCFQ and to test alternative models.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
Participants comprised 368 undergraduate students (n = 288,
78.3% females, 80, 21.7% males), with a mean age of 19.53
(SD = 1.59 years). Self-reported ethnicity included Caucasian
(70.9%, n = 261), Asian (6.8%, n = 25), Black (6.0%, n = 22), Arab
(5.2%, n = 19), South Asian (4.1%, n = 15), Hispanic (2.2%, n = 8),
South East Asian (1.6%, n = 6), Aboriginal (0.3%, n = 1), and other
(e.g., mixed ethnicity, 3.0%, n = 11). As in Study 1, participants
were recruited through Carleton University’s online recruitment
system.
After providing written informed consent, participants
reflected on a recent, personally meaningful academic situation
that they found stressful; the central theme for most students
was “overwhelmed with school work.” They then completed
questionnaires assessing stressor appraisals, coping, symptoms
of depression, and the CCFQ. Upon completion of the study,
participants received written debriefing and were compensated
with course credit.
Measures
Stressor appraisals
The Stress Appraisal Measure (SAM; Peacock and Wong,
1990) assessed several appraisal dimensions in response to the
academic stressor including, perceptions of threat, challenge,
centrality, control-by-self, control-by-others, and uncontrollable-
by-anyone. Ratings were on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5
(a great amount). Scale scores for each appraisal dimension were
calculated by obtaining the mean rating for items comprising
each scale. The internal reliability of each appraisal dimension
was: threat (α = 0.71), challenge (α = 0.65), centrality (α = 0.84),
control-by-self (α = 0.85), control-by-others (α = 0.89), and
uncontrollable-by-anyone (α = 0.71).
Coping style
Coping style was assessed using the Survey of Coping Profile
Endorsement (SCOPE; Matheson and Anisman, 2003). The
SCOPE is a 50-item measure assessing the frequency of
endorsement of 13 coping strategies. For each item, respondents
indicated the extent to which they had demonstrated each of
the behaviors as a way of dealing with stressors in recent
weeks on a scale of 0 (Never) to 4 (Frequently). Based on
previous use of the SCOPE (Matheson and Anisman, 2003)
and a principal component analysis, three broad clusters of
coping were examined: Problem-focused coping, comprising
problem-solving, cognitive restructuring, active distraction,
humor, and social support seeking (α = 0.85); emotion-focused
coping, including rumination, emotional expression, emotional
containment, other-blame, and self-blame (α = 0.88); and
avoidant coping comprising avoidance, wishful thinking, and
passive resignation (α = 0.74).
Depressive symptoms
The 21-item BDI (Beck et al., 1961) was again used to assess the
intensity of depressive symptoms (α = 0.92).
Cognitive control and flexibility
The CCFQ was used to measure cognitive control over emotion
(α = 0.91) and appraisal and coping flexibility (α = 0.90)
processes.
Statistical Analyses
ESEM was used to confirm the structure of the CCFQ. ESEM
was used, as opposed to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA),
because CFA has a strict requirement of zero cross-loadings in
models with more than one substantive factor, which is an overly
restrictive assumption that often leads to poor model fit. In
ESEM, the assumption of zero-cross loadings is relaxed. That is,
cross-loadings are freely estimated in the ESEM model akin to
how cross-loadings are estimated in exploratory factor analysis.
In addition, since the hypothesized two factors underlying the
CCFQ are confounded by valence of item wording (the appraisal
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and coping flexibility factor has only positively worded items and
the cognitive control over emotion consists mainly of negatively
worded items), we included a method factor in the model to
account for variance related to the valence of the items. This was
accomplished by having all the negatively worded items load onto
an additional third factor in the hypothesized model. For model
identification purposes, the method factor was not allowed to
correlate with the two substantive factors and the variance of the
method factor was standardized (i.e., fixed to 1).
In terms of testing strategy, we examined whether the
hypothesized two-factor model (that includes the method factor
for the negatively worded items) provides a better fit to the
data relative to a more parsimonious single-factor model (that
includes a method factor for the negatively worded items). We
also examined whether a more complex three-factor model (that
also includes a method factor for the negatively worded items)
provides a better fit to the data relative to the hypothesized
two-factor model (that also includes the method factor for the
negatively worded items). Mplus v.8.0 (Muthén and Muthén,
1998–2017) and robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimation
were used for all ESEM analyses to minimize the influence of non-
normality on the estimation of the SEs in the model. The χ2 test
of model fit, comparative fit index (CFI), and root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) were used to adjudicate fit in
the ESEM analyses. An excellent model fit would be reflected by a
statistically non-significantχ2, a CFI close to 1, and RMSEA of.05
or less (see Kline, 2016). Models were compared using chi-square
difference tests (1χ2) with appropriate re-scaling.
Pearson correlation coefficients were used to examine the
relationship between CCFQ subscale scores, stressor appraisals,
coping and depressive symptoms. Multiple mediation analyses
were conducted using the PROCESS v3.0 add-on to SPSS
provided by Hayes (2017). Standardized predictor, mediator, and
outcome variables were used in Model 4 of PROCESS, with 95%
Confidence Intervals (C.I.) and 5000 bootstrap samples. Further,
as males and females typically vary in the severity of depressive
symptoms, all mediation analyses included participant gender as
a covariate.
Results and Discussion
Factor Structure of the CCFQ
The hypothesized model provided a marginal fit to the data, χ2
(112) = 223.693, p < 0.0001, CFI = 0.958, and RMSEA = 0.052.
Modification indices suggested that including four correlations
between the residual/error variances of several items would
improve model fit. The residual correlations were between:
(1) “My thoughts and emotions interfere with my ability to
concentrate” and “I get easily distracted by upsetting thoughts
or feelings,” (2) between “I consider the situation from multiple
viewpoints before responding” and “I take the time to see things
from different perspectives before reacting,” (3) between “I can
remain in control over my thoughts and emotions” and “I control
my thoughts and feelings by putting the situation in context,”
and (4) between “I take the time to think of several ways to best
cope with the situation before acting” and “I control my thoughts
and feelings by putting the situation in context.” Because the
wording for each pair of items was similar, we elected to include
the residual correlations in the model to account for additional
method variance.
Notably, the hypothesized model with the residual
correlations provided a good fit to the data, χ2(108) = 132.353,
p = 0.06, CFI = 0.991, and RMSEA = 0.025. Indeed, including the
four residual correlations improved model fit,1χ2(4) = 100.795,
p < 0.001. The magnitude of the residual correlations was
small-to-moderate and ranged from 0.242 to 0.493 in absolute
value.
Next, we tested the fit of the alternative single-factor model
and included the same four residual correlations. This model
provided a poor fit to the data, χ2 (126) = 456.990, p < 0.0001,
CFI = 0.875, and RMSEA = 0.084. As well, the alternative model
provided a worse fit to the data relative to the hypothesized
model with the four residual correlations, 1χ2(14) = 210365,
p < 0.001. Likewise, the three-factor alternative model which
included the residual correlations failed to converge to a unique
solution due to a non-positive definite latent variable covariance
matrix and thus fit statistics are unavailable. Nevertheless, this
result suggests that three substantive factors do not underlie the
CCFQ. In particular, it appears that the items comprising the
CCFQ which assess appraisals and those assessing coping do not
sufficiently (i.e., are not sensitive enough) distinguish between
these processes, and thus converge on a single factor – appraisals
and coping flexibility. In sum, the two-factor model with the four
residual correlations provided the best absolute fit and relative
fit to the data. Of particular significance is that the pattern of
standardized factor loadings for each factor derived from the
hypothesized model (see Table 5) replicates the loading pattern
observed in Study 1. Also, as in Study 1, the two CFQ factors were
moderately and positively correlated, r = 0.49, p< 0.001.
Relationship Between the CCFQ,
Stressor Appraisals, Coping Styles, and
Depressive Symptoms
As shown in Table 6, individuals who reported greater levels of
cognitive control and flexibility on the CCFQ tended to appraise
a personally meaningful academic challenge more positively.
Greater scores on both subscales of the CCFQ were related to
less perceived threat; instead the situation was appraised as a
challenge and more controllable. This was particularly evident
among individuals who scored high on the cognitive control over
emotion subscale of the CCFQ. Neither component of the CCFQ
was related to centrality (i.e., the importance of the situation
to the individual) or control-by-others. Furthermore, whereas
problem-focused coping was more aligned with the appraisal and
coping flexibility subscale, emotion-focused and avoidant coping
were more strongly linked to the cognitive control over emotion
subscale of the CCFQ. Together, these findings suggest that the
CCFQ taps into processes related to effective coping.
It is important to mention that the CCFQ measures
qualitatively distinct features to that of the SAM and SCOPE.
The SAM and SCOPE assess the ‘content’ of an appraisal (e.g.,
levels of threat or control) or a coping strategy (i.e., frequency
of endorsing emotional expression), respectively. By contrast, the
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TABLE 5 | Standardized factor loadings from the ESEM analysis of the CCFQ.
Item Appraisal and coping
flexibility
Cognitive control over
emotion
Method
(1) I weigh out many options before choosing how to take action. 0.621∗∗ −0.056 —
(2) I control my thoughts and feelings by putting the situation in context. 0.448∗∗ 0.206∗∗ —
(3) I take the time to see things from different perspectives before reacting. 0.651∗∗ 0.025 —
(4) I consider the situation for multiple viewpoints before responding. 0.706∗∗ −0.053 —
(5) I can think of multiple coping options before deciding how to respond. 0.637∗∗ 0.158† —
(6) I take the time to think of more than one way to resolve the problem. 0.751∗∗ −0.015 —
(7) I manage my thoughts or feelings by reframing the situation. 0.562∗∗ 0.267∗∗ —
(8) I take the time to think of several ways to best cope with the situation before acting. 0.694∗∗ 0.208∗∗
(9) I approach the situation from multiple angles. 0.133† 0.018 —
(10) I find it easy to set-aside unpleasant thought or emotions. 0.061 0.672∗∗ —
(11) It is easy for me to ignore distracting thoughts. 0.129 0.599∗∗ —
(12) I can remain in control over my thoughts and emotions. 0.174∗ 0.582∗∗ —
(13) It’s difficult let go of intrusive thoughts or emotions. −0.096 0.644∗∗ 0.187∗
(14) I have a hard time managing my emotions. 0.046 0.672∗∗ 0.529∗∗
(15) I feel like I lose control over my thoughts and emotions. 0.089 0.638∗∗ 0.590∗∗
(16) It’s hard for me to shift my attention away from negative thoughts or feelings. −0.037 0.784∗∗ 0.299∗∗
(17) I get easily distracted by upsetting thoughts or feelings. −0.041 0.785∗∗ 0.176∗
(18) My thoughts and emotions interfere with my ability to concentrate. −0.007 0.735∗∗ 0.181∗∗
Note: ESEM, exploratory structural equation modeling. †p = 0.05; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01, bold font indicates the factor in which the items were included.
TABLE 6 | Relationship between the CCFQ, stressor appraisals, coping style, and symptoms of depression.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(1) Cognitive control over emotion – – – – – – – – – – – –
(2) Appraisal and coping flexibility 0.52∗∗∗ – – – – – – – – – – –
(3) Threat −0.36∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ – – – – – – – – – –
(4) Challenge 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ – – – – – – – – –
(5) Centrality 0.09 −0.01 0.48∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ – – – – – – – –
(6) Control-by-self 0.25∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.04 – – – – – – –
(7) Control-by-others 0.01 0.03 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.05 0.39∗∗∗ – – – – – –
(8) Uncontrollable −0.16∗∗ −0.04 0.45∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ – – – – –
(9) Problem-focused coping 0.18∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.04 0.31∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗ – – – –
(10) Emotion-focused coping −0.61∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗ 0.16∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.07 0.29∗∗∗ −0.07 – – –
(11) Avoidant coping −0.41∗∗∗ −0.11∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.05 0.17∗∗ −0.06 0.04 0.17∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ – –
(12) Depressive symptoms −0.57∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ –
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
CCFQ assesses the ‘processes’ of appraising, reappraising, and
coping (i.e., generating multiple alternative appraisals and coping
methods), independent of content (i.e., the use of a particular
coping strategy). Thus, although all three measures assess aspects
of ‘coping effectiveness,’ each measure taps into distinct factors.
Multiple mediation analyses were conducted to determine
whether certain stressor appraisals and coping strategies
mediated the relation between CCFQ scores and depressive
symptoms. In the analyses concerning stressor appraisals, all 6
appraisal dimensions were entered simultaneously as proposed
mediators, and for analyses involving coping, all 3 forms of
coping were considered together. The total effect of cognitive
control over emotion on depressive symptoms was c = −0.572,
SE = 0.043, p < 0.001. Although cognitive control over
emotion was associated with several appraisal dimensions,
only uncontrollability uniquely mediated the relation between
cognitive control over emotions and depressive symptoms
(Table 7). The direct effect of cognitive control over emotion on
depressive symptoms remained significant after accounting for all
6 appraisal dimensions, c’ =−0.469, SE = 0.044, p< 0.001.
The total effect of appraisal and coping flexibility on depressive
symptoms was c = −0.389, SE = 0.048, p < 0.001. As shown in
Table 7, although the appraisal and coping flexibility component
of the CCFQ was related to multiple stressor appraisals,
the relation between the appraisal and coping flexibility and
depressive symptoms was uniquely mediated by threat appraisal.
Yet, the direct effect of appraisal and coping flexibility on
depressive symptoms remained significant after accounting for
all 6 appraisal dimensions, c’ = −0.303, SE = 0.045, p < 0.001.
The present findings indicate that, although greater cognitive
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TABLE 7 | Multiple mediations analyses examining the direct and indirect effects of CCFQ subscale scores on depressive symptoms through stressor appraisals and
coping style.
Depressive symptoms (Y)
ai path bi path Indirect effect (aibi)
Independent variable (X) Mediator Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p Coefficient Boot SE Lower Upper
Cognitive control over emotion Threat −0.363 0.049 0.000 0.099 0.059 0.097 −0.0352 0.0216 −0.0805 0.0061
Challenge 0.243 0.051 0.000 −0.071 0.052 0.167 −0.0173 0.0131 −0.0441 0.0078
Centrality −0.088 0.052 0.090 0.060 0.051 0.247 −0.0040 0.0053 −0.0172 0.0043
Control-by-self 0.254 0.051 0.000 −0.085 0.057 0.141 −0.0219 0.0191 −0.0663 0.0097
Control-by-others 0.008 0.052 0.874 −0.046 0.045 0.308 −0.0015 0.0039 −0.0103 0.0060
Uncontrollability 0.159 0.051 0.002 0.137 0.049 0.006 −0.0202 0.0121 −0.0485 −0.0021
Appraisal & coping flexibility Threat −0.202 0.051 0.001 0.190 0.062 0.003 −0.0362 0.0153 −0.0701 −0.0104
Challenge 0.202 0.051 0.001 −0.097 0.055 0.078 −0.0192 0.0127 −0.0474 0.0027
Centrality 0.001 0.052 0.984 0.054 0.055 0.320 0.0007 0.0043 −0.0077 0.0106
Control-by-self 0.190 0.052 0.003 −0.091 0.062 0.141 −0.0169 0.0154 −0.0517 0.0098
Control-by-others 0.025 0.052 0.638 −0.022 0.048 0.644 −0.0008 0.0033 −0.0081 0.0060
Uncontrollability 0.051 0.052 0.329 0.146 0.053 0.006 −0.0060 0.0095 −0.0283 0.0113
Note: Bold font indicates significant effects.
control and flexibility (as assessed by the CCFQ) was associated
with multiple dimensions of stressor appraisals, only perceptions
of threat and control were particularly important to depressive
symptoms. These data are consistent with the view that these
specific appraisal dimensions are particularly linked to depressive
characteristics, and speak to the tendency to interpret (negative)
life events as particularly threatening and beyond the individual’s
control in promoting elevated and sustained depressive affect
(Beck et al., 1979; Folkman and Lazarus, 1986; Abramson et al.,
1989). Moreover, although the present findings are correlational,
these results raise the possibility that lower levels of cognitive
control and flexibility might be associated with a tendency to
interpret stressful situations in a negative perspective. However, it
might be the propensity for individuals who display difficulties of
cognitive control and flexibility to specifically appraise stressor as
threatening and uncontrollable that promotes sustained negative
affect.
As displayed in Table 8, problem-focused and emotion-
focused coping uniquely mediated the relation between greater
cognitive control over emotion and lower depressive symptoms,
although the direct effect of cognitive control of emotion on
depressive symptoms remained significant after accounting for
all 3 forms of coping, c’ = −0.244, SE = 0.048, p < 0.001.
Similarly, the relation between appraisal and coping flexibility
and depressive symptoms was mediated by problem-focused and
emotion-focused coping, but not avoidant coping (Table 8). Once
again, the direct effect of appraisal and coping flexibility on
depressive symptoms remained significant after accounting for all
3 forms of coping, c’ =−0.124, SE = 0.043, p = 0.004.
The present findings suggest that greater cognitive
control/flexibility might be associated with the endorsement
of more effective coping strategies, and that the relationship
between reduced cognitive control/flexibility (lower score on the
CCFQ) and heightened depressive symptoms, might be partially
accounted for by endorsement of ineffective coping methods.
These findings are in line with reports that more frequent use of
emotion-focused and avoidant coping, and limited engagement
of problem-focused methods, were notable among depressed
individuals (e.g., Whatley et al., 1998; Matheson and Anisman,
2003; Abdollahi et al., 2018). Once again, given the cross-
sectional nature of the present data, these findings should not be
interpreted as suggesting causality. Rather, these results indicate
that a proportion of the relationship between CCFQ scores and
depressive symptoms is accounted for by differences in stressor
appraisals and the endorsement of particular coping methods.
STUDY 3. ACUTE STRESSOR EFFECTS
ON COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND
CORTISOL RESPONSES: MODERATING
ROLE OF THE CCFQ
Reduced cognitive control and flexibility was associated with
greater negative appraisals of stressful situations, which, in
turn, was tied to more severe depressive symptoms (Study
2). Accordingly, it follows that when confronted with an
acute stressor, individuals with lower levels of cognitive
control/flexibility would appraise the challenge as more stressful
and display more negative affect following the experience. To
investigate this hypothesis, individuals with varying levels of
cognitive control/flexibility based on the CCFQ were exposed to
a psychosocial stressor (the Trier Social Stress Test; TSST) and
were subsequently asked to appraise the challenge and report
their current mood state.
Cognitive control processes, including cognitive reappraisal,
not only play a central role in emotion regulation, but might
also be associated with neuroendocrine and brain functioning
(Ochsner et al., 2012; Compton et al., 2013; Denson et al.,
2014; Silvers et al., 2015). In particular, it was surmised that
prefrontal cortical top–down control contributes to the inhibition
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TABLE 8 | Multiple mediations analyses examining the direct and indirect effects of CCFQ subscale scores on depressive symptoms through coping style.
Depressive Symptoms (Y)
ai path bi path Indirect Effect (aibi)
Independent variable (X) Mediator Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p Coefficient Boot SE Lower Upper
Cognitive control over emotion Problem-focused 0.175 0.052 0.001 −0.237 0.040 0.000 −0.0420 0.0170 −0.0797 −0.0124
Emotion-focused −0.606 0.042 0.000 0.439 0.051 0.000 −0.2623 0.0404 −0.3444 −0.1890
Avoidant coping −0.408 0.048 0.000 0.045 0.048 0.340 −0.0181 0.0184 −0.0531 0.0195
Appraisal and coping flexibility Problem-focused 0.324 0.050 0.000 −0.243 0.042 0.000 −0.0786 0.0189 −0.1187 −0.0442
Emotion-focused −0.337 0.049 0.000 0.513 0.048 0.000 −0.1635 0.0325 −0.2287 −0.1001
Avoidant coping −0.110 0.052 0.035 0.085 0.048 0.075 −0.0080 0.0066 −0.0232 0.0020
Note: Bold indicates significant effects.
of responses generated by limbic functioning, which might
include emotional responses and neuroendocrine outcomes.
Thus, we determined whether individual differences in cognitive
control/flexibility moderated the effects of an acute stressor on
cortisol changes provoked by the TSST (Kirschbaum et al.,
1993). The cortisol response elicited by acute stressors is thought
to reflect an adaptive response to meet acute environmental
or emotional demands (Sapolsky et al., 2000). Thus, it was
hypothesized that higher CCFQ scores would be associated with
a less pronounced cortisol changes in response to the TSST
challenge. This study was restricted to females because of their
elevated propensity to depression relative to that seen in males.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
Participants comprised (n = 47) female undergraduate students,
ranging in age from 18 to 26 years (Mage = 19.00, SDage = 1.56).
Self-reported ethnicities included Caucasian (660%, n = 31),
South Asian (2.1%, n = 1), Arab/West Asian (6.4%, n = 3),
South East Asian (2.1%, n = 1), Hispanic (2.1%, n = 1), Black
(4.3%, n = 2), Asian (2.1%, n = 1), Aboriginal (2.1%, n = 1), and
other (4.3%, n = 2). None of the participants reported a current
physical illness/condition, nor were any of the participants taking
anti-anxiety or antidepressant medications. Almost half of the
participants (n = 20) were taking an oral contraceptive.
Laboratory Session
Laboratory sessions were conducted between 1300 and 1730 h
to minimize the contribution of circadian factors to the
cortisol responses. Participants were asked not to eat, drink
(with the exception of water), or smoke for at least an hour
before arriving to the session. Once signed informed consent
was obtained, participants filled out several questionnaires
concerning demographic information, general health, and
medication history (e.g., antidepressants). Following the 30-
min habituation period involved in completing these measures,
participants provided a baseline saliva sample (for cortisol
determination) and were randomly assigned to either the stressor
or control condition. The control condition involved reading
non-stressful magazines (e.g., O the Oprah magazine) for 15 min.
Further saliva samples were collected at 5, 15, and 30 min
following the stressor or control tasks.
The Trier Social Stress Test (TSST)
The TSST is a laboratory task designed to elicit psychological and
physiological stress responses. Participants were told that they
would engage in a public speaking task (about applying for a
research assistantship), and given 5 min to prepare, after which
they made their presentation in front of a panel of graduate
student judges. Thereafter, participants engaged in an arithmetic
task for 5 min. This consisted of participants being asked to
subtract by 17, beginning with the number 1762. Participants
were also told they were being videotaped during the TSST. Once
the TSST (or control task) were completed, participants filled out
several questionnaires concerning stressor appraisals, mood state,
and cognitive flexibility.
Measures
Stressor appraisals
The SAM (Peacock and Wong, 1990) was used to assess perceived
stressfulness of the task, where higher scores represent greater
perceived stressfulness (α = 0.81).
Negative mood
The negative affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule-Expanded Version (PANAS-X; Watson and Clark,
1999) was used to assess the intensity of state negative mood
immediately post-TSST. Responses ranged on a six-point scale
from 0 (not at all) to 6 (extremely), with higher scores indicating
greater intensity of negative affect (α = 0.89).
Cognitive control and flexibility
The 18-item CCFQ was used to measure individual differences
in cognitive control over emotion (α = 0.88) and appraisal and
coping flexibility (α = 0.91). The correlation between the two
CCFQ components was r = 0.34, p< 0.05.
Salivary Cortisol
Saliva samples were frozen at −80◦C until assayed for cortisol
levels. Following the manufacturer’s protocol, a competitive
radioimmunoassay, 125I kit (ICN Biomedicals Inc., Irvine, CA,
United States), was used to determine, in duplicate, salivary
cortisol levels. The intra- and inter-assay variability was <10%.
The minimum detectable level of cortisol was 0.02 µg/dl and the
specificity was 100%.
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Statistical Analyses
Moderation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS v3.0
script to SPSS provided by Hayes (2017). Using Model 1 (to assess
interactions), stressor condition was entered as the predictor
variable, unstandardized CCFQ scores were entered as the
moderating variable, and unstandardized appraisal, mood, and
cortisol responses were entered as the outcome variables. Given
the correlation between the components of the CCFQ, in the
moderation analyses, when assessing the interactive effects of one
component of the CCFQ (e.g., cognitive control over emotion),
the second component (e.g., appraisal and coping flexibility)
was treated as a covariate. Results without this procedure are
presented in Supplementary Material (Supplementary Analyses:
Study 3). Furthermore, as oral contraceptives can influence
cortisol responses to a stressor (e.g., Kirschbaum et al., 1999;
Mordecai et al., 2017), this variable was treated as a covariate in
analyses concerning cortisol response.
Cortisol Area Under the Curve increase (AUCi; Pruessner
et al., 2003) was computed to examine changes, represented by
a single value, in cortisol levels elicited by the stressor and control
tasks. In the formula below, Cort represents the absolute cortisol
value in µg/dl and T refers to the length of time between cortisol
sample collections. For example, T1 represents the length of time
between the collection of cortisol sample 1 (Cort1) and sample 2
(Cort2). T1 = 20 min; T2 = 10 min; T3 = 15 min.
AUCi =
(
(Cort2 + Cort 1)
2× T1 +
(Cort2 + Cort 1)
2× T2 +
(Cort2 + Cort 1)
2× T3
)
− (Cort1 × (T1 + T2 + T3))
Results and Discussion
The TSST challenge was appraised as being more stressful (main
effect of condition: b = 3.16, SE = 0.93, p = 0.001) relative to
reading a magazine in the control condition. However, contrary
to expectations, individual differences in the appraisal and coping
flexibility, 1R2 = 0.03, F(1,42) = 3.07, p = 0.09, and cognitive
control over emotion, 1R2 = 0.00, F(1,42) = 0.16, p = 0.69,
components of the CCFQ did not moderate this effect. Thus,
cognitive flexibility as assessed by the CCFQ might not contribute
to differences in overall perceived stressfulness concerning an
acute challenge. Perceived stressfulness, however, was related to
greater negative affect (r = 0.74, p < 0.001) and, although not
quite statistically significant, elevated cortisol AUCi (r = 0.30,
p = 0.06).
As predicted, the TSST elicited greater negative affect than
the control condition (b = 37.17, SE = 9.43, p < 0.001), but this
effect depended on differences of cognitive control over emotion,
1R2 = 0.08, F(1,42) = 0.7.35, p < 0.01. As shown in Figure 1,
among individuals reporting low cognitive control over emotion,
the TSST elicited greater negative affect compared to the control
condition (b = 19.40, SE = 3.41, p < 0.001). By contrast, among
individuals with high cognitive control over emotion, the TSST
and control condition provoked equally low levels of negative
affect (b = 5.18, SE = 3.40, p = 0.14). These findings were unique
FIGURE 1 | Moderating effect of cognitive control over emotion in the relation
between stressor condition and negative affect. Low cognitive control over
emotion = 1 SD below the mean, high cognitive control over emotion = 1 SD
above the mean.
to cognitive control over emotion, as the appraisal and coping
flexibility component of the CCFQ did not moderate the effects of
stressor condition on negative affect, 1R2 = 0.02, F(1,42) = 1.72,
p = 0.20. Thus, in line with the findings presented in Study
2, when confronted with a stressful situation, greater ability to
disengage (or shift attention away) from negative thoughts and
emotions (as measured by the cognitive control over emotion
dimension of the CCFQ) might be accompanied by less intense
negative mood or increased emotional regulation.
The Stressor Condition × Cognitive Control over Emotion
interaction accounted for considerable variance in cortisol
response, 1R2 = 0.08, F(1,35) = 3.67, p = 0.06. As shown in
Figure 2, in comparison to the control condition, the TSST
elicited greater cortisol levels (i.e., larger cortisol AUCi index)
among individuals with low cognitive control over emotion
(b = 17.25, SE = 6.84, p = 0.02), but not among those with
high cognitive control over emotion (b = −1.99, SE = 6.81,
p = 0.77). This effect was unique to cognitive control over
emotion as the variation in appraisal and coping flexibility did not
moderate the effects of stressor condition on cortisol response,
1R2 = 0.01, F(1,35) = 0.24, p = 0.63. Moreover, when not
controlling for the appraisal and coping flexibility, the Stressor
Condition × Cognitive Control over Emotion interaction was
slightly weaker, 1R2 = 0.06, F(1,36) = 2.56, p = 0.12. Thus,
greater cognitive control over emotion, or the ability to disengage
from negative cognitive and emotional states, might not only
serve to regulate emotions effectively, but might also play a role
in regulating the cortisol response associated with a stressful
situation.
It is not entirely clear why the cognitive control over emotion,
but not the appraisal and coping flexibility component of the
CCFQ, uniquely moderated the cortisol response to the TSST.
However, these findings are consistent with previous reports
indicating that trait rumination, which has been associated
with diminished cognitive control over emotion (Koster et al.,
2011), predicted delayed cortisol recovery following an acute
psychosocial stressor (Zoccola et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2013).
In contrast, cognitive reappraisal, potentially because of the
degree of effort required to engage in this emotion regulation
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FIGURE 2 | Moderating effect of cognitive control over emotion in the relation
between stressor condition and cortisol Area Under the Curve increase
(AUCi). Cortisol AUCi represents the relative change in cortisol levels (in µg/dl)
from baseline. Low cognitive control over emotion = 1 SD below the mean,
high cognitive control over emotion = 1 SD above the mean.
strategy, was associated with elevated cortisol reactivity (Denson
et al., 2014). Indeed, these findings might also partly explain
why the moderating effect of the cognitive control over emotion
component of the CCFQ was stronger when the appraisals and
coping component was controlled for.
Because the present version of CCFQ assesses “trait” cognitive
control/flexibility, it was not possible to determine whether
individuals actually engaged in these behaviors during the
stressor session, although trait measures have been reported
to predict responses to acute stressors (e.g., Zoccola et al.,
2010; Stewart et al., 2013). This aside, the main purpose of
the present study was to determine whether the CCFQ, as a
measure of cognitive control and flexibility in stressful situations,
would effectively predict cognitive, emotional, and physiological
responses to an acute stressor, which was, in fact, found to occur.
However, as the present study included only females, it is remains
uncertain whether a similar pattern of results would be observed
amongst males.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research examined how cognitive control and
cognitive flexibility might be expressed in stressful situations
and the processes through which reductions in these abilities
might be linked to elevated depressive symptoms. To this
end, the CCFQ was developed was developed to assess an
individual’s perceived levels of cognitive control and flexibility
that were displayed through three stress-related processes,
including attention, appraisals and reappraisals, and coping.
The CCFQ comprised two distinct, yet overlapping
dimensions of cognitive control and flexibility, which exhibited
good internal reliability and construct validity. The cognitive
control over emotion dimension of the CCFQ assessed the extent
to which an individual perceives that they can control intrusive
and repetitive (primarily negative) thoughts and emotions that
are ordinarily elicited by a stressful situation. As assessed by
this dimension of the CCFQ, individuals who perceive having
greater cognitive control over emotion more readily shift their
attention away from negative cognitive and emotional states,
allowing them to focus their efforts on directly resolving a
stressful situation. In contrast, individuals with perceived low
cognitive control over emotion are more likely to engage in
repetitive negative thinking and the excessive processing of
negative emotions. As assessed by the CCFQ, reduced cognitive
control over emotion was associated with increased repetitive
thinking and rumination, elevated negative affect following
a stressful situation, and ultimately heightened symptoms of
depression. Furthermore, diminished cognitive control over
emotion was linked to elevated and prolonged cortisol reactivity
following an acute challenge, a neuroendocrine profile that has
been associated with depressive illness (Juruena et al., 2017).
The appraisal and coping flexibility dimension of the CCFQ
assessed an individual’s perceived ability to engage in a set of
deliberate effortful behaviors that can facilitate a comprehensive
and favorable appraisal of a stressful situation as well as the
selection of a broad range of coping strategies. In particular,
greater scores on the appraisal and coping flexibility dimension
represent a tendency to approach stressful situations from
multiple perspectives prior to responding, manage negative
thoughts and emotions by reframing or reappraising stressful
situations, and generate multiple and alternative coping strategies
prior to selecting the appropriate response. Low appraisal and
coping flexibility, by contrast, reflects a tendency to respond too
readily or automatically, resulting in more reactive cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral responses. In the present study,
diminished appraisal and coping flexibility were accompanied by
negative stressor appraisals, lower reappraisal in the context of
emotion regulation, the endorsement of ineffective and inflexible
coping, and heightened depressive symptoms.
A central aim in developing the CCFQ was to examine
aspects of cognitive control and of cognitive flexibility relevant
to stressful situations that have yet to be explored using
other measures, including the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory. It
was expected that the two questionnaires would display some
convergence given that they both assess aspects of cognitive
flexibility. This said, the way in which the CCFQ and Cognitive
Flexibility Inventory conceptualized and assessed cognitive
flexibility differed, and thus these measures might be predictive of
different processes. Specifically, the CCFQ explicitly and directly
focused on the (negative) cognitive and emotional states elicited
by a stressful situation, and the cognitive control processes
required to regulate these responses. In turn, as indicated in Study
1, higher scores on the CCFQ were most strongly related to
greater cognitive reappraisal as well as less perseverative thinking
and rumination. In contrast, the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory
focuses on challenging and replacing maladaptive thoughts
with more balanced and adaptive thinking, and was more
strongly related to coping flexibility and expressive suppression
(emotional containment). Thus, although each measure might be
useful in different settings, their concurrent use might be equally
valuable in distinguishing different aspects of cognitive flexibility
relevant to stress-related psychopathology.
Through the development of the CCFQ, the present research
provided insights into how cognitive control and cognitive
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2219
fpsyg-09-02219 November 15, 2018 Time: 15:43 # 17
Gabrys et al. Stress, Cognitive Control and Flexibility
flexibility might be manifested in stressful situations, and whether
reductions in these abilities might be accompanied by elevated
symptoms of depression. To be sure, the CCFQ was not
developed as a diagnostic instrument, but instead was intended
to compliment behavioral paradigms in determining common as
well as different aspects of cognitive control and flexibility that
are disturbed among individuals with depressive pathology. From
this perspective, distinguishing components of cognitive control
as well as cognitive flexibility through both behavioral tasks and
self-report measures, might offer clues regarding effective clinical
treatment approaches (e.g., personalized/precision treatment) for
depressive pathologies. Moreover, although the present research
focused on depressive symptoms, the CCFQ might also be useful
in relation to other psychiatric disorders that have been associated
with impaired cognitive control and flexibility, including anxiety
(e.g., obsessive–compulsive disorder), substance use, bipolar, and
eating disorders (Cunha et al., 2010; Gruner and Pittenger, 2017;
O’Donnell et al., 2017; Park and Moghaddam, 2017; Perpiñá et al.,
2017).
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